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emocracy and the Carteliza-
tion of Political Parties (2018) 
provides a well-reasoned and in-
depth case for the cartel party model, and 
yet fails to convincingly bring the theory 
up-to-date. Katz is currently chair of the 
Department of Political Science at John 
Hopkins University and Mair was a pro-
fessor at the European University Institute 
in Florence until his death in 2011. Their 
thesis is this: in order to maintain their 
position in the face of declining political 
participation, parties take part in a kind 
of implicit collusion, in which they limit 
interparty competition, finance themselves 
using state resources, and focus increasingly 
on managerial competency rather than pol-
icy. The cartelization theory was originally 
proposed in the 1990s, but this volume 
constitutes the first book-length discussion 
of it, and as such it expands the authors’ 
thesis, addresses criticisms which have been directed at it and of-
fers a coherent and well-structured argumentation for their claim 
that large political parties in advanced democracies have become 
cartelized. The authors are careful to base their model on empirical 
findings, and as such they include a significant amount of clear-
ly-presented data and examples from within Europe and the USA. 
This sets the volume squarely within the field of comparative poli-
tics. However, the cartel party model was first proposed three dec-
ades ago, and despite a final chapter which deals with the current 
rise of populism, the theory is perhaps on the cusp of becoming less 
pertinent to today’s political reality, as the proposed political cartels 
begin to disintegrate.
After a comprehensive introductory chapter, which provides a clear 
and relatively detailed overview, the core of the book begins by 
charting the evolution of political parties. From elite parties of the 
19th century, through mass parties, catch-all parties and on to cartel 
parties, this development is explained as a response to significant 
social and historical changes. Cartel parties are not the end-point 
of a linear progression, but rather, just like other party types before 
them, an adaptation to social and political changes, and thus will 
also be superseded by a new type of party system. The cartel thesis 
was born from a data-gathering project in the 1990s, during which 
Katz and Mair noticed two major developments, which they argue 
have continued and indeed become more marked to this day (22). 
Firstly, parties have been moving increasingly closer to the state. An 
increase in legislative constraints and state financing draws the par-
ties towards the government and therefore away from the citizens 
they are meant to represent. Secondly, the locus of power within 
parties has been shifting towards the party 
in government, and away from the party 
on the ground and the party as organisa-
tion. These three “faces” of the parties, as 
the authors term it, exist in an uneasy con-
flict, with varying degrees of autonomy and 
importance (54). With mediatisation and 
the increased need for funds and expertise 
that it brings with it, parties have become 
increasingly professionalised. The authors 
also note a corresponding increase in politi-
cal careerism (76).
The central argument of the cartelization 
thesis is that political parties are becoming 
more similar – differences between them 
need to be minimised in order to pro-
duce the effects of cartel-like behaviour. 
This is driven in part by increased legisla-
tion, for example with regards to funding, 
campaigning and media appearances. All 
parties have to follow the same rules and 
thus begin to act in more similar ways. Katz and Mair state that 
parties were originally exogenous to the state and represented the 
demands of the electorate, but now they (collectively) have become 
a state-funded and -controlled institution (114). As is repeatedly 
pointed out, the regulation concerning their organisation and fund-
ing is passed by the government, which the parties themselves run. 
Politicians may not share a party, but they do share a profession 
and thus in order to pass beneficial legislation for their parties and 
themselves they need the support of other parties. This therefore 
encourages cartelization.
Katz and Mair suggest that a further cause of increasing similarity 
between parties is the passing of responsibility for various policy 
areas, including the economy, on to supranational or non-parti-
san organisations such as the EU, the World Bank, the WTO, the 
courts and private companies through privatisation. Issues which 
were once political become the sole responsibility of experts and 
technocrats, which leaves little space for ideology and policy (93). 
As is demonstrated by various data, the policies of mainstream par-
ties have converged, with a much narrower choice on offer to voters 
(85). This shifts the focus of campaigns on to a comparison of man-
agerial competence rather than political or ideological differences 
(82). The authors offer further evidence of this by showing that par-
ties are much less selective with regards to their coalition partners, 
and will enter into coalitions which would have traditionally been 
unthinkable. The competition that remains between them is merely 
for show, and thus, worryingly, “democracy is hollowed out” (28).
Ultimately, in a cartel system the effects of (inadvertent) collusion 
and cooperation significantly diminish the difference between win-
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ning and losing an election and between being in and out of gov-
ernment (147). Thus the parties face lower risk, and need not be 
as responsive to voters. Interestingly, the authors go on to argue 
that the characteristics of a cartelized party system are not hugely 
dissimilar to the characteristics of the consensus democracy mod-
el, and yet the former is seen as a threat to democracy whilst the 
latter is seen as a valid, if imperfect, democratic form (148). Katz 
and Mair perceive the main similarities as being a delegation of 
responsibility by parties, a lack of power from voters, and a blurred 
distinction between parties which have won in elections and parties 
which have lost.
The final chapter offers a discussion of the result of cartelization, 
namely the rise of what the authors term the “anti-party-system 
party”. These populist parties (on both the left and the right) aim 
to break up the arrangement between the established parties (151). 
Populism sees the actions of cartel parties as being aggressively 
self-interested, whereas Katz and Mair describe them as being de-
fensive, protective measures against threats to their privilege. Due 
to the dialectical nature of party evolution, Katz and Mair predicted 
in the 1990s – before populist parties were as significant a force as 
they are today – that cartel parties would give rise to their antithesis. 
The rise in populism cannot be explained by short-term triggers 
such as the 2008 financial crisis or increasing immigration, but 
must instead be seen as a piece within a long process of historical 
change. They argue that current governments cannot fulfil the in-
consistent expectations of their electorate: they have to balance the 
electorate’s goals with the bureaucrats’ techniques, and resolve the 
conflict between liberal individualism and the notion of a united 
nation with a single interest. Thus voters turn to populist parties, 
which seem to offer a genuinely different alternative.
Katz and Mair conclude with the statement that it is unclear whether 
democracy is truly in danger, but that current events could logically 
lead to that conclusion. They very briefly propose a three-pronged 
solution: more responsibility to be taken on by politicians, a more 
inclusive political community, and more realistic expectations of 
government amongst the populace. They admit, however, that this 
is extremely unlikely to happen and instead advocate waiting for 
the next type of party system, which will arise as an as-yet-unknown 
synthesis of current political circumstances.
This volume is a substantial and clearly-argued expansion of Katz 
and Mair’s previous theory in the on-going debate about the state 
of democracy. As a whole, the book is moderate and considered in 
tone. Katz and Mair reject calling the current state of democracy 
a “crisis”, remarking that people have been worried about a crisis 
of democracy for the past 40 years. Party systems are seen within 
a sweeping historical arc, and the dialectical conception of party 
development gives assurance that things will change – although 
in what direction remains unclear. That being said, the authors 
do speak of democracy being hollowed out and facing peril, and 
their conclusion is certainly disheartening – in a cartelized system, 
self-interested, colluding parties become state-mouthpieces whilst 
abandoning their duties to the electorate. Their brief mention of 
some potential but highly improbable solutions does not offer the 
reader much hope.
Although the book as a whole is very clear and readable, the central 
terms “cartel”, “conspiracy” and “collusion” could be more consist-
ently used. On occasion, it is unclear whether the authors intend to 
imply that the parties are part of a deliberate conspiracy, or whether 
they mean (as is usually, but not always, the case) that a cartelized 
party system simply produces the effects of collusion, without covert 
coordination. Furthermore, their discussion of the term “cartel” 
within economics muddies its meaning in their work even further. 
They describe, within economics, the blurring between oligopoly 
and cartel, and then argue that parties are similarly oligopolistic, 
but this fails to sufficiently clarify or justify their use of the term 
(132). Their choice of analogy between the cartelization of politi-
cal parties and professional sports teams, however, is expedient. In 
sport leagues, a cartel develops to carefully manage competition on 
the field (analogous to elections) in order to ensure a particular di-
vision of revenue (government resources and positions) between the 
club owners (politicians).
In spite of the book’s clear and cogent form, doubts may arise as to 
the continued relevance of its content. Perhaps Katz and Mair have 
tried to apply their model too widely, and have stretched it beyond 
both its temporal and political limits. It is certainly not a given that 
empirical findings, the first of which were recorded in the 1960s, 
remain valid to this day, even if the authors have included more 
current data in this volume. To take an example, the data included 
to illustrate the convergence of parties’ manifestos only extends to 
2005 (86-87). Excluding the most recent thirteen years of manifes-
tos ignores an increasing polarisation in politics, which, inciden-
tally, has not only occurred in minority and alternative parties as 
Katz and Mair suggest, but has also taken hold within mainstream 
parties. The most obvious examples of this would be Trump within 
the Republican Party and, in the UK, Corbyn shifting the Labour 
Party to the left.
Furthermore, the authors are careful to highlight the utility and 
limitations of the cartel party system as a theoretical model, reiter-
ating that no model completely matches reality, but it may have also 
been fruitful for them to refine the scope of its suitability. It would 
seem that it applies more readily to consensus/consociational rath-
er than majoritarian democracies, to borrow Lijphart’s distinction 
made in “Patterns of Democracy”. The theory of cartelization is an 
overwhelmingly negative take on political parties. Thus, although 
the authors themselves do not draw this distinction, their theory 
is more disparaging and critical towards consensus democracies – 
whether or not this was the authors’ intention.
Intergenerational justice is clearly not the focus of this book, and 
the authors do not make much reference to young people. Indeed, 
when they do it is to say that many young party members join 
only to further their own political career and as such contribute 
to political careerism and by extension cartelization. This is over-
ly cynical, and ignores the positive role young people can play in 
shaping politics. Furthermore, the question remains as to wheth-
er the cartelization model is truly still the most fitting model for 
the political sphere in which young people find themselves today. 
The rise of populism is not only confined to marginal parties, but 
is finding its way into the mainstream. Perhaps the new synthesis 
that the authors predicted is already taking shape, and bruising or 
indeed breaking the cartel in the process. As younger and new gen-
erations come of age, their political world will no longer be shaped 
by a cartel of parties as was the case in the 2000s, but instead by 
new forms of parties.
Undoubtedly, this book is a worthy contribution to the study of 
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comparative politics and provides a comprehensive discussion of 
the cartelization model – a theory of significant influence. There is 
certainly benefit to be found in the methodical and orderly way in 
which Katz and Mair take the reader through their theses, though 
more could have been done to bring the model up-to-date and 
assess future developments. The book is to be recommended as a 
robust discussion of social pressures on political parties, the ways 
in which they adapt to these and the state of democracy during the 
past few decades – if not right up to today.
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